RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 12d5ca706e2d3ad2

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

848.8 KB

MD5: 55339c946ae6a509127fc05f2c3ba054 SHA-1: e406202f658e49d28477babfecbcda75f8200373 SHA-256: 12d5ca706e2d3ad2d716cdb50d37f67da95efd04a0ed65ef8abd2d2bd7ae23a7

202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing embedded OLE objects, specifically related to the Equation Editor. Critical heuristics indicate the presence of a CVE-2017-11882 exploit, which is known to execute arbitrary code. This suggests the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability to deliver a malicious payload upon opening.

Heuristics 6

Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED

RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000000c7.bin` `ca3750dfc8d6e51a87c2c124571321c016e110d8a3e9298799f554f9b04257fd`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xC7	415782 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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