Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 12ce6adbd6da928e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.60 MB
MD5: dbac9d9bd8c475d5d62cc69209ff4d92 SHA-1: d4d68c09666a7760f024f6af52922680dd8bc820 SHA-256: 12ce6adbd6da928e954da05cd0363c9298538503bfa7a7778110bfa87514adf6
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers heuristics related to the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). This indicates the file is designed to exploit this known vulnerability for client-side code execution. The document body contains obfuscated JavaScript-like code, suggesting an attempt to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000011e1.bin
45b2cb91894d29a3c71f86ff03166a52444e384c7d2c88bf784b0cff276712a8
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x11E1 55951 bytes
objdata_01_off000333c7.bin
078f4826f1fd7ea74b366f8203fc5dc103f9012dddd7cede4b9d1d69bc7eed6c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x333C7 351910 bytes