Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 12cb510d48dff1da…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

85.7 KB First seen: 2023-01-19
MD5: 059fee740645a2f10827b38a872d575f SHA-1: 7a036bd043741abf9418220000af124fe75788a5 SHA-256: 12cb510d48dff1da5d33299e52fa688049fd6c4fe66e6ded8fc09a0dfe8493e2
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically identified as an Equation Editor exploit. The document body presents a plausible lure, an academic assignment, to encourage the user to enable editing. This combination strongly suggests an attempt to exploit a vulnerability, likely CVE-2017-11882, to execute a malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000532c.bin
14e98107b874d956e4f3345d7d5d17bc665e64305e249e59b85bda18b3c91673
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x532C 1714 bytes