Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 12c7a2b631026a3c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

159.0 KB Created: 2001-12-14 14:26:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 9.0
MD5: 20b4789c0b2eb0363f6c7071947230ec SHA-1: 2cda9c9ecfe36dd45c23d65c3d239ce3ce82045b SHA-256: 12c7a2b631026a3c861a255176af6ecab36db42318342229d60d3a7f28b86562
320 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

The sample is a malicious Microsoft Word document exploiting CVE-2006-6456, a vulnerability in how Word handles malformed table SPRM data. Heuristics indicate the use of WinExec, CreateProcess, VirtualAlloc, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress, suggesting the execution of shellcode. A suspicious invocation of cmd.exe was also detected, likely to facilitate the execution of a downloaded payload. The document body contains heavily obfuscated and unreadable content, providing no direct clues to its purpose.

Heuristics 8

  • CVE-2006-6456 — Microsoft Word malformed table SPRM critical CVE exact CVE_2006_6456
    WordDocument contains a malformed table border-color SPRM in the CVE-2006-6456 shape: a valid table-SPRM cluster is followed by an invalid high-byte 0xFF SPRM where Word expects a normal sprmTBrc*Cv record. Vulnerable Word 2000/2002/2003 parsers corrupt memory while handling this malformed data structure.
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 162,816 bytes but its declared streams total only 94,801 bytes — 68,015 bytes (42%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API

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