Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 12c3f9d3a8d5a3dc…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.9 KB Created: 2021-09-18 07:08:32 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: 99f29d545a5562a4b3f6a7b3dff97c55 SHA-1: 4c6ad7c7bbee1df471b9bb5cdde8390be6f8cc74 SHA-256: 12c3f9d3a8d5a3dc82843ae05e9e1a51e6d0bfbf9fcab0d6411c0a5835774934
212 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and multiple URLs, several of which are associated with link farms and compromised CMS uploads. The 'SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH' heuristic specifically identifies an attempt to phish for Netflix credentials via the URL https://queure.ru/uplcv. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely to deliver a phishing page or a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9951

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure high SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: call-to-action link host does not match the impersonated brand: https://queure.ru/uplcv?utm_term=menu+button+apk+free+download.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://queure.ru/uplcv?utm_term=menu+button+apk+free+download PDF link annotation
    • http://henca.com/files/details/file/64818936198.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://walnutcreekguide.com/wysiwygfiles/file/58733150960.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.1000ena.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16140643cceefa---fukigodone.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://biogenetec.tw/image/files/20210902_113634.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rayocazar.com/images/elfinder-1.1/files/file/82650843346.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lse.hu/userfiles/file/keludabigeg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://yas-center.ru/userfiles/file/60688206235.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://etevent.itweald.com/uploads/files/613cfb1e30046.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ondebiz.com/userfiles/file/dokisiziganurebag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sooam.com/files/fckeditor/file/232584629613f208df327e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://assignmentmart.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/lijug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.lowdoc-loans.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613cbf73385ae---96743442989.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://damnoen.com/ckfinder/pho/files/85465022444.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://0985028898.kad.tw/kads/ckfinder/userfiles/files/27581675330.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://morebricks.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/jotusumuze.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dison.cn/filespath/files/20210909065808.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ipmarketing.net/FCKeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/userfiles/file/37034612714.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nicemexico.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613fe42d7b986---18507198828.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cetis156.neutronds.com/assets/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/76549295486.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ntct.dz/ckfinder/userfiles/files/25404558540.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.mediagrand.hu/data/editorfile/zibojevupozax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bjsddesign.com/filespath/files/20210918120522.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fong-cai.com/upload/files/kuzodezipowugosawamat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lamelove-zakryti.cz/userfiles/file/buwomutegilesese.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e524.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE524 18864 bytes
SHA-256: 7c2c471e8788b46f74a7f25bd3e5d0738996028ad6413c99116fb272629ba5ca
font_01_sfnt_off00011617.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11617 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00012e2e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12E2E 10640 bytes
SHA-256: 3a5ea4b32e77cedda54baa222d2adbf06efffa947e978e8943a94c6b3b01b079

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