Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 12b2906174350f82…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

19.7 KB
MD5: d48bb400090ff130079a7ddf7f13787b SHA-1: ba1a9f05900dc4f6a37a74f65f51fffc5d0cff88 SHA-256: 12b2906174350f82229f31d2aa68a04b4d802d2e13e8fad3439a8c208e3f6ebf
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects and specifically targets the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate heuristic indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated, likely leading to the execution of malicious code. This is a common technique for delivering secondary payloads, hence the high confidence in exploitation for client execution.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000016d6.bin
c786c03571976ee6d017bda516e549ff9589a935f3c929cc742b3f7b9a95697b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x16D6 1848 bytes