RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 12a5e00bf4e4962f

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

42.3 KB First seen: 2023-02-20

MD5: d3e650f0f23e54a6505072d5d000e67c SHA-1: 2d41dff392ce7e290d7aa5e8336b42c0178aa41e SHA-256: 12a5e00bf4e4962f6141dd3f67ab06ce45d608e500b13cd009cdfd0b60d2ab8e

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit CVE-2017-11882. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic confirms the document instructs the user to enable editing, a common tactic to bypass macro security. The RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristic suggests the embedded object is configured to activate automatically upon opening. No specific family could be identified.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000042b4.bin` `b961c828cad830d50bfb3cb8fd2763b628568077f772eddd387d071115c4e49b`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x42B4	1982 bytes

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