Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 129984878081051f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

856.1 KB Created: 2011-11-09 09:23:06 +01:00 Authoring application: Adobe InDesign CS4 (6.0.6) (via Adobe PDF Library 9.0)
MD5: e3b37e03f5323177ea8be273de444bba SHA-1: 36858a80ddca0cffb82c47d5bed741bcacd39e75 SHA-256: 129984878081051f8462ec451c01f79485dbbbecb114ba440d107b9e2ae0bb8f
476 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains a JavaScript action that triggers a launch action, specifically targeting cmd.exe. This action is designed to export an embedded file named 'deep-security-datasheet-de.pdf', which itself is detected as a Windows executable by ClamAV. This indicates a multi-stage attack where the PDF acts as a dropper for a malicious executable, likely downloaded from one of the unknown reputation URLs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9884

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\deep-security-datasheet-de.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Unusually high stream count medium PDF_MANY_STREAMS
    PDF contains 501+ stream objects — may indicate heap spray or heavy obfuscation
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/
    • http://]hostname[:port]/path
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/g/img/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/illustrator/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/t/pg/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/Dimensions#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/g/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ManifestItem#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xmp/InDesign/private
    • http://www.apache.org/

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
deep-security-datasheet-de.pdf
47dd86a1e654018075e5eea2b00012ef662499c67bb2485fb265a7005096610f		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 857 at offset 0xCAB09 73802 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0858_000.js
c52e2c799547d92481ae6e3eecf0090d91e8b6d83ef86ebd4e399d0b167eb293		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 858 at offset 0xD5760 75 bytes
stream_026_off00016913.bin
17cb1c30bfd2811795fb053a2720292a77f6e799f6f384ca1b313731d3a03f76		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x16913 51890 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0000d257.bin
be7baccaaeca96278938cb32214a77c22ee5eb549c1d5cca526b5a6a2cbfed78		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD257 8572 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000e7f6.bin
3d79a11db58ec265309075d6e68ee1cd8ff325f9745d013fae30e3df3dbfa289		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE7F6 40372 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000146a1.bin
af936e5330dd7221ac455e7859c18284bfe6ced88927a6d2cd1340c999329f53		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x146A1 14008 bytes

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