Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1297b63033d69d58…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.18 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 66fb1e481850bc2c045d30101ddb86b0 SHA-1: 71d7d67b2c80dac1454569f59566e05bad39f3c1 SHA-256: 1297b63033d69d58678ebb103cbf1d4bb759fbf043752483f470f49a212f655e
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is identified as malicious due to a critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-0199, indicating it attempts to load a remote resource. The embedded VBA macro, while not containing executable statements itself, is part of the exploit chain. The heuristic also identified an embedded PDF with suspicious static findings. The primary IOC is the URL used for the remote payload download.

Heuristics 4

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://techuntangler.tools/eSCHQk
    • http://evertype.comhttp://tulrich.comCopyright
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLRupakaraRegularRupakara

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off000010ab.bin
41c2901ebda5b5d79d4a68e71278578ac4fe004bea942385b0ed0c502c07b584		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10AB 88240 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00096e00.pdf
74a8ca13a7c09fd30d41386a093642cc99d517b68392a8f3784605a5c05334bc		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x96E00 617984 bytes

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