Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 127ff69b488236ff…

MALICIOUS

PDF

29.5 KB Created: 2020-06-07 05:27:12 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 56f810cc4c347295f7243d69dd563011 SHA-1: 234fbd54cca41f7401c09dd805d06ee442d517dc SHA-256: 127ff69b488236ffdd6d438983b8beb5f422cb833ae4a4c0301f044493668319
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a large number of embedded external links, identified by the PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristic. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. The document body, though obfuscated, contains URLs that are also present in the heuristic findings, suggesting a coordinated effort to direct users to a network of linked PDF files.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://webdisk.abingdonbeecompany.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398225/131398225.html#a%25C4%259Flar+gezer+ankaral%25C4%25B1
    • http://graceorrell.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130968972/6033713.pdf
    • http://piecesinplace.org/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636689/06d0121ca77f2.pdf
    • http://lauriborer.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606092/9d71ca70.pdf
    • http://hostmaster.cottondownsouth.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438667/3580905.pdf
    • http://crunchplugins.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130639349/botaderazuxajo_fidozotugimifa_fasirimatepi.pdf
    • http://thegoodplan.org/uploads/1/3/0/3/130323329/9111d3099e3f29e.pdf
    • http://ninefortyfilms.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739778/rojorererefep-volato-jozuwo-serojizuwetiva.pdf
    • http://hostmaster.arthurgietzelt.com.au/uploads/1/3/0/4/130490687/513115.pdf
    • http://blueskypopcornremoval.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130539612/0e41d468efe61.pdf
    • http://gillinghamtravelltd.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130621596/jaxipesizis-buxusawe-xigawu.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://tezojukoj.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/99319626064.pdf
    • https://zepolibegam.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/80713055369.pdf
    • https://widerug.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/2694522219.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000047be.bin
c3569e52b2e990fe78c1a357b8c65185ac659df5cecfa0c1df30bf99d3ae1490		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x47BE 10812 bytes

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