Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1267620dd1a2fbd5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

583.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 328743fdbdb5cd296a8fc5765c46cb38 SHA-1: bf5f4414dd9936265c45d8ce9a04f9de469092e5 SHA-256: 1267620dd1a2fbd56d2ac66e8c040a46bd82cc7def27afcfdb4588120636e7c0
104 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The critical heuristic firing indicates exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object, which attempts to load a remote resource. The embedded URL 'https://dealc.me/nSSybp' is the likely source of the secondary payload. The presence of a polyglot PDF with suspicious findings further suggests a multi-stage attack. The file's primary function appears to be acting as a loader for malicious content.

Heuristics 4

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://dealc.me/nSSybp

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
polyglot_child_pdf_off00080800.pdf
c1c0f27df9e599365e1f7277cc7710dbc891460529e63545a8350ebf3fd8789a		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x80800 70656 bytes

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