Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 12614daca061254d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.8 KB Created: 2020-08-03 06:45:16 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 9bb9c2cd3124b6e7dab0c011b82a9c30 SHA-1: 314831d2920f1547bdf454694dbf12894042c8ad SHA-256: 12614daca061254d3eff88f01a1c5f6ffa4e4027d5c7c0adcfeb7d9a7a254ce4
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a lure to copy and paste content into a command-line interface, which is a common technique to bypass security controls and execute malicious commands. The embedded URL `https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=install+github+windows+command+line` suggests a redirection to a malicious payload. The large number of PDF links also indicates a link farm, likely for SEO poisoning or distributing malware.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=install+github+windows+command+line
    • http://files.gsugba.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407705/9685710.pdf
    • http://files.merrieswain.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740097/6403403.pdf
    • http://files.mingsgardenwillowglen.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164009/rodagevepobo_zamukivulepuf_wumifemazokasi.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/4892/7386/files/76436196449.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/7934/1982/files/bigoxovuwuzubogiwe.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/rejupabofutub.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/9860/3669/files/jutinipo.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/7141/3160/files/nisomosawufigoguwepi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/1488/0405/files/mibuxeremad.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/3190/3902/files/52970285131.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/4556/1254/files/67731785957.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/5419/4085/files/71783851256.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/5884/6109/files/fawilivak.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/3504/1693/files/18119462769.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5702/9018/files/initiative_macro_roll20.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000068a2.bin
e1f20122e3f4deae118baf36dfa474c2e9a623747b66897cf3048d6e7f49b07c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x68A2 5428 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007b03.bin
e22e703c4df9f7e64626d218ed6f838ccf0bab2d1f8e9e360743efc408521994		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7B03 10420 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.