Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 123414c6853c8bdb…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

25.7 KB First seen: 2023-03-20
MD5: 4d645cd3b3cc05e5d6e00b84989bed90 SHA-1: 8a0afebd0853e6fd5297c04a3e69a21de8cb5091 SHA-256: 123414c6853c8bdbf36dc6074c0b4e98e1a40919b7b65101c88dda664073249f
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of malicious OLE object embedding, specifically targeting the Equation Editor component. The presence of \objupdate and SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristics suggests the document is designed to trick the user into activating the embedded object, which likely exploits a known vulnerability to execute a payload. No scripts were extracted, and the document body content appears to be legitimate marketing material, indicating the lure is external to the visible text.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004407.bin
12af45b62fdfb0870eee878bf7b3758646d4b7ac2b3652cfd345adf974dd190b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4407 1618 bytes