Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 122698df363f7be8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.7 KB Created: 2021-07-04 01:00:20 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2026-06-04
MD5: fa15df2043d9e8d97cbde5c5b5f4c3a8 SHA-1: a58baa42e2bd1407a4c269e683741cc4c4bb65f9 SHA-256: 122698df363f7be8c3ee76b9295fda1f96ed31c57868d144216b221ef435703b
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF file contains a link farm with numerous URLs pointing to compromised CMS websites, indicating a potential effort to manipulate search engine results or distribute malicious content. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious, and the presence of multiple links to compromised upload directories supports this assessment. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was unreadable, limiting further analysis of specific payloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9951

Heuristics 5

  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://nocenzura.space/web/img/podborky/files/ginuxozowevemepeniminufa.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://msci.com.ng/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b3fd7254196---88629794591.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://forkidsvietnam.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8s4bb7l6s6233v3dvs3kq3fndg/mumirojobanemumanolufur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.audifonosdoshoydos.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608028b301b2c---50054137366.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://legacydockandmarine.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/049e3c3f36b73116d4cd233c02ab3dcc/43450428157.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://escolacaritas.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c9505fa91cb---24696618066.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.circoloaletrium.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607c2f88e24d5---28954947184.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lavera.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16088417ec93bc---5575546917.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tantex.org/tantex/tantexuserfiles/file/35652747828.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://piqiso.ru/userfiles/file/kitokas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.beewellrx.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/tmp/mixiluk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.johnknox.ch/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a73ec783ed0---11228820736.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://akdenizokullari.k12.tr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2b6hkilp7qk57ncn9jpounj0va/67605490618.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.bluegreenshouseboats.in/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b2e1bf0036d---67628293073.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.alertgy.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5afe3782222861c5298f0b17301ea6ab/wamipuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://smilepath.com.au/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3f84c34a1293edf798dedc4283cb1ed0/koxixewoxosug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://coloreverything.love/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6081bc5aa5e463accb531ff873f0e5b4/98359487525.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://frasertechno.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160862de7e02bd---17062952600.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.suffaheducation.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16090464b9f286---47917226186.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.ogblfrontaliers.fr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/iotoce3kurr624u7kdhtdmctfn/fegupaximikivogudekez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://travelselection.us/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160947fb36c131---mubefinizozogutusapepeze.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://liyangah.com/Upload/file/14306704965.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aduanaldelvalle.com/userfiles/file/jenet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dentinale.eu/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8aef19635f0ca5d09febf640c1b8b853/pugojogixezudotafulutaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://businessservicesuk.com/userfiles/file/kixivimuxomukanivukajuk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/1KS0DP0cxss/uplcv?utm_term=example+of+task+analysis+in+the+classroomPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e806.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE806 11036 bytes
SHA-256: afb8124bbc168133951c2e4dddf5b80dc45c2a0f1849225541429642d44b5acd
font_01_sfnt_off0001018d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1018D 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off0001199f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1199F 16936 bytes
SHA-256: b53ef378a11e45173011e17ea34035feb6ce845904271ccee1e6563c86e92110