Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 122661866914db6f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

263.6 KB Created: 2022-08-17 08:55:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-08-17
MD5: 4dc4e4cdbb920324e41cb58b53c323c0 SHA-1: 4c9d118e5902d42dff7d50142dcc37f8a188ab09 SHA-256: 122661866914db6f67347ba163d75480e968eb4e1a936ef77f8658b1c70a36e5
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: DLL Side-Loading

The sample contains an embedded OLE object, identified as a risky file type that drops an auto-executable payload with a .jar extension. This indicates a likely attempt to deliver a secondary malicious payload. The embedded OLE object and the potential execution of a JAR file are the primary indicators of malicious activity.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
84c840ea650f8a681896a21145e42702c7e2b63c0b42717de6d420fe42eb53b7		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 181248 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.96, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
2ef6df2329e0228e06a9669bc9c6253d8f2b2f5d7e838d87c86920405522f53f		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 176690 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
c8d286edce9a0f4f9df2914626adfab83e0cb95ca5b7649808a4d96e527084ca		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image3.emf 5464 bytes

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