PDF malware analysis — malicious · 121cecaac2ed051a

MALICIOUS

PDF

3.26 MB First seen: 2026-05-13

MD5: 64e6e093777d9e9df0fec48f5c326403 SHA-1: c04b8b496468a469417958cf7a398b55ea1e00f2 SHA-256: 121cecaac2ed051a4b47f991e344232edf93b22d543a83d07e32f4840a579551

72 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript that is obfuscated but identified as a dropper. This script is designed to launch and drop a second-stage payload, likely exploiting a vulnerability to achieve execution. The PDF itself is structured to lure the user into opening it, as indicated by the 'PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE' heuristic, while the embedded JavaScript is the primary mechanism for malicious activity.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier clean score 0.0026

Heuristics 4

exportDataObject + nLaunch — embedded-file launch-on-open dropper critical PDF_JS_EXPORT_LAUNCH_DROPPER

PDF JavaScript calls exportDataObject() with nLaunch set, which extracts the document's embedded file and launches it in its default application. This is a launch-on-open dropper: the embedded file is the payload. No benign workflow auto-launches an extracted PDF attachment. (identified after nested-decoder de-obfuscation)
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE

PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`embedded_file_obj0064.bin`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 64 at offset 0x196B0C	2137088 bytes
SHA-256: `16570f60c96ab98eace39c72c2e02ed4fdb370c1686ad6cdb8e36846213a1984`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 7.41, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
`objstm_0001_00.bin`	pdf-objstm-decoded	PDF /ObjStm 1 0 obj (inflated)	1880 bytes
SHA-256: `2898fb97431841376cd944ba98ae8764ea710fa707deef0b5cf02736b441fb5e`

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