Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 12016a108e323f3e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.63 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 426df8644cfbe2312ab47d0d57345d52 SHA-1: 63dfd0d6ac6cc89db24eb3c2c55788acae4bb7e2 SHA-256: 12016a108e323f3ea577aac06d4fbf5e9d60af5ce4c09ef7c7a5fc55fb7d5983
70 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an Excel file that exploits CVE-2017-0199, a known vulnerability for remote code execution. The heuristic indicates it attempts to load a remote URL, which is confirmed by the extracted URL. The VBA macros are present but appear to contain no executable statements, suggesting the exploit is directly leveraged by the OLE structure rather than macro code. The primary function appears to be downloading and executing a second-stage payload from the provided URL.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://seethebestkissinggirlformyhandwithnicetrickwithgreatapperanceofthedayfor.business@acessaurl.com/Zadvqdy

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes