RTF malware analysis — malicious · 11e7ffa53cdb57a6

MALICIOUS

RTF

41.3 KB First seen: 2023-07-25

MD5: 6f42aebfe381bc4ddb80eaec97dbbe2c SHA-1: d345a079bb897c235559e679fdd8e1388a43a8a4 SHA-256: 11e7ffa53cdb57a6d71399a74efd26bc674d03d67a8b6dc75464d2576c687564

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059.005 PowerShell

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive forces OLE activation, and the document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing'. This suggests the file is designed to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability to execute a malicious payload upon user interaction.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00005721.bin` `ed499422c1c581fa9dcaa7ed6f25b03345b96fd85a5f9a830169e176728d2ef2`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x5721	1418 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.