Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 11e606671fb43646…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

178.0 KB Created: 2001-12-14 14:26:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 9.0
MD5: 448caba29fa199123c9f53af613ca964 SHA-1: 2c351e4fb60a3493a1fc4ba24e6a2e0514e92283 SHA-256: 11e606671fb436468959323b889e180ed34cbdea8b1f1a58c7e2bc18d2856696
320 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

The sample is a Microsoft Word document that exploits CVE-2006-6456, a vulnerability related to malformed table SPRM data. Heuristics indicate the use of WinExec, CreateProcess, VirtualAlloc, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress APIs, strongly suggesting the execution of arbitrary code. The presence of suspicious cmd.exe invocation further supports the likelihood of a secondary payload being downloaded and executed, potentially via PowerShell or cmd.exe.

Heuristics 8

  • CVE-2006-6456 — Microsoft Word malformed table SPRM critical CVE exact CVE_2006_6456
    WordDocument contains a malformed table border-color SPRM in the CVE-2006-6456 shape: a valid table-SPRM cluster is followed by an invalid high-byte 0xFF SPRM where Word expects a normal sprmTBrc*Cv record. Vulnerable Word 2000/2002/2003 parsers corrupt memory while handling this malformed data structure.
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 182,272 bytes but its declared streams total only 94,801 bytes — 87,471 bytes (48%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API

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