Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 8

• PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
  PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
• Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
  PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
• XFA form low PDF_XFA
  PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
• JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
  PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
• Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
  PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
• Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
  The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
• Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
  One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL https://www.services-publics.lu/assistants/public-defo?ECITIZ_ACTIVITY_PATH=Usager&amp;ECITIZ_PROCESS_ID=MULT-DEFO&amp;FORM_TYPE_ID=AEV_VFE_FR

  • http://www.monotype.comMonotype
  • http://ocsp.verisign.com0
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xfdf/
  • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
  • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
  • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xfa/promoted-desc/
  • http://cgi.adobe.com/special/acrobat/update
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/2.6/
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/2.8/
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.6/
  • http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/
  • http://get.adobe.com/reader
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.7/
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.6/
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-form/2.8/
  • https://www.verisign.com/rpa
  • http://ocsp.verisign.com/ocsp/status0
  • https://www.verisign.com/rpa0
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA.crl0
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typography
  • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_arial.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.html
  • http://crl.verisign.com/tss-ca.crl0
  • http://crl.verisign.com/ThawteTimestampingCA.crl0
  • https://www.verisign.com/rpa01
  • http://crl.verisign.com/pca3.crl0
  • http://CSC3-2004-crl.verisign.com/CSC3-2004.crl0D
  • http://CSC3-2004-aia.verisign.com/CSC3-2004-aia.cer0
  • http://www.adobe.com/typehttp://www.adobe.com/type/legal.html

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