Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 11e021f5ccf8e8af…

MALICIOUS

RTF

12.2 KB
MD5: 7698f54f3b0f38dc05f02553f5e2b90d SHA-1: fa53e6670613fb8d56789a27ae77927ec9600a52 SHA-256: 11e021f5ccf8e8af0f64a10c1fae6285df671c2ad5a97d30f0d888374764128b
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that triggers CVE-2017-11882 via Microsoft Equation Editor. This exploit is known to be used for initial execution, often to download and run a second-stage payload. The specific Equation Editor class 'equaTIOn.3' is a strong indicator of this exploit.

Heuristics 5

  • Obfuscated Equation Editor ProgID + activation critical CVE related RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID from top-level \objdata hex after nested RTF junk groups are ignored, and the document also contains \objemb plus \objupdate activation. This is an obfuscated Equation Editor exploit surface associated with CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 families, but no exact malformed MTEF CVE primitive was recovered from this object.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002037.bin
bcb89d218f922fff21b493226d34bdadfaa4706f381331d6d745af2f35e6425e
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2037 1790 bytes