Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 11c28afacf6bea27…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.04 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-02-11
MD5: 9cb690e41fbc8d9f99099234b01b623e SHA-1: ab2a502af3831711753d6b0de777d6e1951ef0dd SHA-256: 11c28afacf6bea2772cae5463686f49a1b2c03d14879cea1cc83e5c91a96efaa
150 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an Excel file containing an embedded Equation Editor OLE object, which is a known vector for exploiting CVE-2017-11882. The VBA macros are present but contain no executable statements, indicating the exploit payload is likely within the OLE object itself. The primary attack vector is the exploitation of this specific vulnerability.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDX) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDX)
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
c8d2d4b816bfc229b54dace67bbbaeac64bd52fed25c60a1fd6881dc8410e8a4
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD022FC3D8/olE10NAtive 2141 bytes