Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 16

• Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
  PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
• Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
  PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
• /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
  PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\acrobat_8_help.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
• Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
  An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
• Recovery secret / private key request critical SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LURE
  Document requests recovery phrases, private keys, backup codes, or saved passwords. Requests for these secrets in a document are high-risk.
• ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
  ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
• ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
  ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
• /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
  PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
• Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
  Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
• Unusually high stream count medium PDF_MANY_STREAMS
  PDF contains 501+ stream objects — may indicate heap spray or heavy obfuscation
• JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
  PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
  PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
  PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
• External URI info PDF_URI
  PDF contains an external URL action
• Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
  One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://server/folder

  • http://www.color.org
  • http://www.zeustech.net/
  • http://]hostname[:port]/path
  • http://www.adobe.com/go/partner_public_acrobat_sdk_doc
  • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
  • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
  • http://www.adobe.com/go/partner_public_acrobat_sdk_doc)/S/URI
  • http://www.adobe.com/go/support)/S/URI
  • http://www.adobe.com/go/acr8_digital_editions)/S/URI
  • http://www.adobe.com/go/ext_icc)/S/URI
  • http://www.loc.gov/standards)/S/URI
  • http://www.adobe.com/go/accessibility)/S/URI
  • http://www.adobe.com/go/acrobat_developer)/S/URI
  • http://www.adobe.com/go/adobecom_acrobat)/S/URI
  • http://www.adobe.com/go/partner_public_opi2_spec)/S/URI
  • http://www.adobe.com/go/partner_public_pdf_ref)/S/URI
  • http://www.adobe.com/go/partner_public_acrobat_sdk)/S/URI
  • http://www.apache.org/
  • http://www.iec.ch

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