Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 11ae57b50b30536d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

70.5 KB Created: 2021-05-28 02:53:14 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 1648bdc2359dbbca55e4deab084ea55a SHA-1: 5af218b6fd9be96c2f33dbf3e7e947f3dac0e052 SHA-256: 11ae57b50b30536da843d06bffb3b1befc8290cef9854adb097cb58cf40c3a90
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous links to external websites, many of which are hosted on compromised CMS platforms or disposable domains, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URIs are indicative of techniques used to redirect users to potentially harmful sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://kvartira-zalog.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/31e1c98925f3bae371e8e6e968f67941/xigatu.pdf
    • https://winston-woodward.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/90aff2c71f2638d3b4626fbbce829776/zusuvijujumopoxolotevejep.pdf
    • http://akcjonariusz.com/UserFiles/file/numagidu.pdf
    • https://ifacemount.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bs7cc8ntumktv9cjobf7ae673o/85727329101.pdf
    • https://aquafilling.com/userfiles/file/65337486428.pdf
    • https://proxus.nl/file/33033133128.pdf
    • http://ankurgroups.com/userfiles/file/91852917182.pdf
    • http://doks-films.com/pcms/content/file/kigoxalufe.pdf
    • https://mygamedaysports.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f714927bc73fc4872cee445b9999a198/39971568666.pdf
    • http://ya-ke.cn/admin/upload/66559651488.pdf
    • http://www.leesii.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16076e13991ab8---babipesirasiwekewudejen.pdf
    • http://157.230.241.115/image/upload/File/15636816057.pdf
    • http://training-solutions.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a276b1dd7a8---90543377610.pdf
    • https://mattweidnerlaw.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608cd33a8bb97---79377935246.pdf
    • http://www.liveartsaskatchewan.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16080031b31366---33261636836.pdf
    • http://tfh-filter.hu/_user/file/sobajokipobumijinokosol.pdf
    • http://www.nisbd.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607940ea80bd5---51710762333.pdf
    • http://accessiblevehicleservices.com/userfiles/file/94026605569.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/LPIa9PGmDLg/uplcv?utm_term=the+official+act+prep+guide+2020+answer+key
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d306.bin
3f1167afcc9cf9257b9596085182f4168b4162322f3e64e62c01285cda1b39c6
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD306 5896 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000e72e.bin
e2681ce112e2ce01728a96b7ef1941928c682bf79995646f44a94170bcb1a0f4
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE72E 11124 bytes