Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1148d0e5cbe365be…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.5 KB
MD5: ebc500d04ca591a37b983f0d80a2adc4 SHA-1: e6bd53bd852860e9bfd678cca673452f9f775f47 SHA-256: 1148d0e5cbe365bec3ffc50e55c16fc857367c10b31657beaeb8a747258e5147
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution on the victim's machine, likely as part of a spearphishing campaign.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000ca.bin
2724bea9ed03f4830000766f13c9c988abb36153f5887e56aa0a1e3cd4b1af49
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xCA 2033 bytes