Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 11218736568a7a58…

MALICIOUS

PDF

185.7 KB Created: 2010-08-20 14:26:22 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Word (via Mac OS X 10.5.8 Quartz PDFContext)
MD5: b1fa2279f40fc0760f99416d5947c540 SHA-1: 4bd66712176484549ae1930f7bd40d99f716c182 SHA-256: 11218736568a7a58213b0892305505248635837cf8857d50052bb8b6b08ceef1
516 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes the `exportDataObject` function, which is known to be used for launching embedded executables. This is further supported by critical heuristics indicating a launch action targeting `cmd.exe` and an embedded PE payload. The embedded JavaScript likely facilitates the download and execution of a second-stage payload from one of the provided URLs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\s.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/
    • http://]hostname[:port]/path
    • http://www.apache.org/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
s.pdf
c0c42acf87515a6f0c56442698a5d4a67864059f78195b5e039bf44c6f3669db		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 60 at offset 0x23642 73802 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0061_000.js
5532057d0a4f993567233608a586fae4063b2614ca0c3076c7dda43523fbd4b2		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 61 at offset 0x2E2BE 50 bytes
icc_00_off000005be.icc
2a18161bb96fd584d19e737ce294732789e0e8e6ae8c8e4e5f09f1b138232a63		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x5BE 1456 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0001c208.bin
b32a0dff558e3adf222981559bf97e6b4d84d0b496dd7422f99e7905b53d68d5		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1C208 14272 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001e8de.bin
96aab773eeedacf120b604a49eaa8b5aa1748705c9b7aa0bccc536fbe4c1ac23		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1E8DE 23252 bytes

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