Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 112181241c7cb667…

MALICIOUS

RTF

94.1 KB First seen: 2024-07-29
MD5: f7c34c11bb5d9cdcece78edae0beff42 SHA-1: 96f2510fbb5c6203e21ead4dd55daaab59a86f4e SHA-256: 112181241c7cb66758507fdce08e40069efa3e82bedb39eb98c833e5291109d3
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of ` objupdate` indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, leading to code execution. This technique is commonly used to download and execute a second-stage payload, hence the high confidence in this attack pattern.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001df4.bin
69d2f4dd1530d84def9c0c1349bc8957486fb3a97f31444f36cc62d97c67aef0
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1DF4 1959 bytes