Hancitor — Office (OOXML) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 111a2dc96e082b86…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

387.9 KB Created: 2021-01-13 15:00:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 2cf234a33be54ffa5c49f4380e01fdac SHA-1: e7f83e5d90d318368b355b78f4d92c01f9b5def3 SHA-256: 111a2dc96e082b86a79dd90ec307c977a21c7aee0ddb141d688a17bd65f3661d
382 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Hancitor · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro that executes upon opening the document, as indicated by the Document_Open and steptwo subroutines. This macro utilizes ShellExecute to run a constructed command, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0' strongly suggests the Hancitor family, known for its dropper capabilities.

Heuristics 10

  • OOXML Ole10Native with payload/link indicators — possible CVE-2026-21514 high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Office document contains embedded OLE (word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin) with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. This is a likely CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape.
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
1c54a9d5dec593a1fa242a2f2aea775d7c43058a4371bd2883fa9d6b480571af		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3927 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
0e4960d84c6dd31b4754dc9414713003935b1060a97a92c8ad9da561cfde57df		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 477184 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
996650d8bfdc0c080aa72acd73f0ffab2cb3dc5766490a9dd4eafe816e1762da		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 470849 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
4cda84624f73a656cfdd8b00bb94271bf14e4ed30494832277c7197708b3b600		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 26112 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
emf_00.emf
c4c9ee4bb089dfb38616f6e8b2dfab79c3df1351c96757ea8e79f51e85b004c0		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5788 bytes

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