Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 10f8873955770e84…

MALICIOUS

PDF

86.5 KB Created: 2021-06-27 16:21:51 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 8eb2bb5695ed9a42d7d6ab0dd9eb8b10 SHA-1: a381a6132826eb75d8ef318d716ab5528f2f6b89 SHA-256: 10f8873955770e84baa7440783aa986b4879dcb152542c6ff752d42481e0ec34
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, many pointing to compromised WordPress upload directories, suggesting it's part of a phishing or malware distribution campaign. The presence of a visual download button further supports this, aiming to trick users into downloading a malicious payload. ClamAV detection as 'Pdf.Phishing.Trojan' reinforces the malicious classification.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9848

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://bezpiecznamlodosc.org/files/file/sijoburusorej.pdf
    • https://fatheragneliti.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160971f100d45b---35526124858.pdf
    • https://we-plus.tw/ckfinder/userfiles/files/sixifoludovexikug.pdf
    • http://www.orarestauratorisaf.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609605a0b2b48---zozodiridozipaxerowetudaw.pdf
    • http://j-club.eu/userfiles/file/99552443824.pdf
    • http://raffaelecavazzoni.com/userfiles/files/75750102006.pdf
    • http://www.barankayalar.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16077a627f22b3---vakalabexaguruli.pdf
    • http://www.1000ena.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609f02a8cc189---retapo.pdf
    • http://www.bestlifepolicy.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16075ee817ba57---javokupugetuwaz.pdf
    • https://zzarosiscarampola.it/file/48629824448.pdf
    • https://www.varishastalari.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160746cea696da---lefadivakokadijamesuguvon.pdf
    • http://wskinbody.com/data/boardData/files/42333541088.pdf
    • http://amandamaitland.com/images/file/54550798563.pdf
    • http://willtorock.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b8454e27ce6---fesiwezoda.pdf
    • http://svenstavik.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c521346c1a9---80490392836.pdf
    • http://www.medicalalliedtraining.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a4fb507de81---tilerusagimarub.pdf
    • https://xn--fct8ml6mwue.tw/uploads/files/nebanuwefatapew.pdf
    • https://chocoinmobiliario.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/51a3966a504a39e368ccf06a47c68a82/79531449986.pdf
    • http://studiotecnicomartani.eu/userfiles/files/66412686399.pdf
    • https://carpanea.it/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ad301346de04511d86ea50621cb2e9d4/jogokopifozunujab.pdf
    • http://www.timtransportes.com/home/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16077586cbc55a---35844420043.pdf
    • https://www.jahnigterbraak.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16083c27a30c9c---zadatetogawomoga.pdf
    • http://cgt-fo-csc.fr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609dd53c2c8da---rukabufupuxetetozagerut.pdf
    • https://ph2020.org/FCKeditor/file/pigipozone.pdf
    • http://short-story.ru/upload/file/rurimusegexogolew.pdf
    • http://amadpich.com/userfiles/file/30903133809.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/GLLx1DTH0VQ/uplcv?utm_term=download+and+install+tubemate
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000eef2.bin
8f9ae41e9867d47ca5a34d5feb5964766faaa70e9825d75e37eccd4637a09e0b
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEEF2 17180 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00011c1a.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11C1A 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00013431.bin
765f4dd2ee5c15884c2be73f785b102aa40b2db9079c1c9cd0f55a50e7caf9e5
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13431 10636 bytes