Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 10f7f836bffa3be5…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

112.7 KB
MD5: 1273db39a771618c7a1841750a800bc2 SHA-1: 49e65f0e870223949fcbd2729368687ad6ec8b38 SHA-256: 10f7f836bffa3be58cef065ca2ba6b45071d2be320c074575981094911cec304
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically identified as a likely Equation Editor exploit for CVE-2017-11882. The presence of \objdata and \objupdate heuristics indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening the document, leading to the execution of malicious code. This technique is commonly used to deliver secondary payloads.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 likely critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    RTF decodes to an activated Microsoft Equation 3.0 OLE storage whose payload is a high-entropy Ole10Native stream rather than normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is a weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape consistent with CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802.
  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001671.bin
eaf9ab00ac6dd8cab14f7e544a70e285bc347393536864b3b57efa413c6df0a4
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1671 4691 bytes