Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 10d9693fb454b12d…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

252.9 KB
MD5: 76fb0f72a46f8ab6d00a0be440c2bf36 SHA-1: 40501aa9be61ffdb72b446db55f9528b9912a4fc SHA-256: 10d9693fb454b12d20e96155fe2b335180d4f737e72980860dd4b4ad0e258321
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects, specifically exploiting the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. This exploit is designed to download and execute a secondary payload from the URL http://www.iarpp.ro/wp-image/obi.msi, indicating a malicious intent to compromise the user's system.

Heuristics 5

  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.iarpp.ro/wp-image/obi.msi

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000d1.bin
d56bd7a53db4da1aeb399e4bca78fca3e5be89556955e6ab328b5d921d1c84f8
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD1 15672 bytes