Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 10ccb1b373ecc9cc…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.7 KB
MD5: dbca72285fe1dc06f5835bcb90efcbc2 SHA-1: 32b65f2c91276eadcb44cc6bdef22e86249bdddf SHA-256: 10ccb1b373ecc9ccf7def36bad5231f11d794ab556b424a3464b8b3c5bec9585
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data, specifically triggering heuristics related to Equation Editor and CVE-2017-11882. This indicates the file is designed to exploit this known vulnerability for code execution. The presence of 'EQUaTIon.3' strongly suggests the exploitation of the Equation Editor component. The likely intent is to leverage this exploit to download and execute a secondary malicious payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Obfuscated Equation Editor ProgID + activation critical CVE related RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID from top-level \objdata hex after nested RTF junk groups are ignored, and the document also contains \objemb plus \objupdate activation. This is an obfuscated Equation Editor exploit surface associated with CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 families, but no exact malformed MTEF CVE primitive was recovered from this object.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000047.bin
ca91a8d231fea66244e802735af5127afc03ee18bc3ecac6af82e4d8d6b3ec4a		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x47 1772 bytes

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