Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 10cb76b5779351b6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

244.6 KB
MD5: df3085c728295405ae0c225041980f94 SHA-1: 66f6da87eca6c8c5990bbbffb85dd155a4f082a8 SHA-256: 10cb76b5779351b69610edbc34d4d3066cd55c9d3ab1722826bf545a9e654902
390 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file contains a critical PDF_LAUNCH heuristic firing, indicating it attempts to execute cmd.exe. Further analysis reveals that cmd.exe is used to decode and execute a PE payload, identified by the PDF_VBS_DECIMAL_ARRAY_PE_PAYLOAD heuristic. This payload has a SHA256 hash of fc780efe356258258a01f4ef29e7842b82bd048555a8137a70fe030de04ff0ac and was extracted as decimal_array_pdf_pe_00000229.exe. The embedded script also contains a decimal array that decodes to this PE payload, confirming its malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 7

  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • VBScript-style decimal byte array decodes to a PE payload critical PDF_VBS_DECIMAL_ARRAY_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF comment text contains a VB/VBScript-style decimal byte array, such as c(077),c(090), that decodes to a verified Windows PE executable. The rule is gated on a comment-line Array(c(...)) assignment and a valid MZ/PE header to keep false positives low.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/c echo Set fso=CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Dropper-132 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Dropper-132
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_0003cc93.bin
254e055144dfc4a9a2397ba61d986921ae80ec817787ca53a224b4aaef4b3f74
pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x3CC93 248958 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Dropper-133
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 shell/COM execution token(s).
decimal_array_pdf_pe_00000229.exe
fc780efe356258258a01f4ef29e7842b82bd048555a8137a70fe030de04ff0ac
embedded-pe PDF raw comment decimal-array PE payload at offset 0x229 35205 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.77, consistent with packed or encrypted content.