Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 10bbf0e704485e52…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

620.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-08-04
MD5: 7c2a9d58e144b4000c87b50529b0cde8 SHA-1: b6862254d1262ecadb08762f12a1079bd7f03c7d SHA-256: 10bbf0e704485e52fea9ba5ceaf19489e04afd0736ff63ced71c25c3b7ae85ad
134 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious Link T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-0199 indicates that the OLE object attempts to load a remote resource from the URL http://23.95.60.83/form/3/g0034902904909rw909009q02040a3409qq04409023%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%2330040a3220%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%2300000aq00q0q0q0q0.DOC. The presence of embedded PDF artifacts and the 'POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE' heuristic suggest a multi-stage attack involving a PDF payload. No VBA macros were found to be executable, but the primary exploit vector is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://23.95.60.83/form/3/g0034902904909rw909009q02040a3409qq04409023%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%2330040a3220%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%2300000aq00q0q0q0q0.DOC
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
stream_003_off00005f60.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x5F60 252488 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0002b37d.bin
68d167e68895a344f3603a4efd0d8438eb8fdebe759cee48f2b4adf75c76c961		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2B37D 12100 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0002d195.bin
50551000b9f90b3f445ee94749557d9ddf96697a74984b3ccf3d2bae66910750		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2D195 15820 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00000e00.pdf
a67cc6299263d182cdbda5f6c422f6f503533aa0227cb8dd93f4690760c069a6		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE00 631808 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006400.pdf
2a3ae510af4acbda147e6365fec6e2c0eaaac2eb9f9cf08aaa9a4909ad8c4071		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6400 609792 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00029200.pdf
6de5ae5a0bee48467a876c5e62bc60f007b2128f2b2556f6998ca196b41c5b0d		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x29200 466944 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00031000.pdf
5706655d564097a63cde290523c9bb9ddc25cf8b33babd4931b40cf8c1421830		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x31000 434688 bytes

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