Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 108dda5b9afaecf4…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.5 KB
MD5: 85419e44c40a6a2086b6dbbf956ca8ab SHA-1: 3f08255d8994d711fe29941523aae6e923084314 SHA-256: 108dda5b9afaecf4be542d01d04c2de722845330401053bc7e9468a880083196
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing embedded OLE object data, specifically related to Microsoft Equation Editor. Heuristics indicate the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882, which allows for arbitrary code execution. This is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads via email attachments.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000e1.bin
c5a384ed16f6662843c49b9910378ebf7f40f23f68c71aeb4ba3660ca26239d5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xE1 1556 bytes