Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 105fc962c30856e3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

37.7 KB Created: 2020-10-26 14:10:05 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-12-26
MD5: 2ce504ac8e2ae159021d18466b60480f SHA-1: 4debb21b1c3620dfeb65d96f1f931b058192e6c4 SHA-256: 105fc962c30856e3b0e87defe0a5fe9b98469de6f58ee4422656aa4a75d62118
244 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure critical SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: action link to abused redirector https://vidojibirulon.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070792/3029088.pdf.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.me/123?keyword=kymco+agility+50+parts+manual In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366041/normal_5f8700f792cb5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4382193/normal_5f9216b3a271e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4386354/normal_5f8fb80685b65.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4376103/normal_5f932bca5ad0a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366029/normal_5f87ad57e0cc0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vidojibirulon.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070792/3029088.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kudojazejugir.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134322101/zegesuroj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nipufijupetobug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131482996/2410368.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://riwisasivituw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070703/gogisiluvaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://radigaligoled.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134333621/sagobovafenife.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zelapagetuwuj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406140/fdf17a0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lajojixuvoporor.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738555/rateradapes_zamobomulig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dimaxafazeza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453031/5e7f5686d0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ligexomapaku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134321337/4048532.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off000055b1.bin)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off000055b1.bin)
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wilugugo/allstate_r3001_exclusive_agency_agreement.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xanebavifamopez/losobotolemixalilesuge.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jamokaroxoj/nifaboteropekixepi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6a7dfa39-bf87-4d72-8917-f348d1753d64/kiwefanuza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4d3cc582-e901-48d2-93e5-cd071f5f0b71/dekid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1a3df325-a487-4781-9722-21137211c929/wumexewosorevijipoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/626ccd06-aee5-47c5-9875-0d751484de90/jenupibexan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/96872cbc-a4de-4574-b9f8-88487b6ba001/12865919483.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/3295/1446/files/lowepi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0497/6050/1921/files/zubesos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0498/6136/1821/files/facebook_sdk_android_studio.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off000055b1.bin)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000055b1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x55B1 5588 bytes
SHA-256: 3d22be4e8be02ed95e83bb187cd64762eea94222642dae4a4f957d6f8c61842a
font_01_sfnt_off000068a0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x68A0 9552 bytes
SHA-256: fdd8714297b26e644b86f8d6fafaf9f685c0e31990a954bac687450615eb05dc