Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 104516024034e12a…

MALICIOUS

RTF

25.3 KB First seen: 2020-09-15
MD5: 1fda7bacc9022a083b2a64a74f309584 SHA-1: 3f059c7fb273b00c16ce141d62a91388c0c49726 SHA-256: 104516024034e12a025637b1427668e057e0b001b1ae0f0ec530340e2253c4fc
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains critical heuristics indicating the use of the Equation Editor vulnerability (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR) and an OLE object update trigger (RTF_OBJUPDATE). This combination strongly suggests exploitation for client execution, likely delivered via spearphishing. The embedded OLE object data is the primary mechanism for delivering the exploit.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000016fa.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x16FA 1798 bytes
SHA-256: 7e4fcbcf77e2bdd3181b94082cf84dbded1b244d72391a228be72bd8f69cf255