Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 104338f5fa5266be…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

310.0 KB Created: 2021-02-19 18:40:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: 155cf08538641e7d40eafa98aada0a28 SHA-1: 258558677b2d5615ff39f99854aed291ab7fc18f SHA-256: 104338f5fa5266be9f6041166d259395c25f68e403000510ff5b510f4a956f85
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1137.006 Office Application Build to Execution: Native Code

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object. This object is identified as a risky file type that drops an auto-executable payload, specifically a JAR file. The presence of the embedded OLE object and its nature strongly suggests an attempt to deliver a secondary malicious payload to the user.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
df5aeb7abb2eea6f9f6ee709d997b4e533eb8829bfc7a0c06acdb162257950c8		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 313344 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.98, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
d401a54e26bc1fc501ff0154b428d8607a91633fad1478558a9e515fe40a7e89		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 308230 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
bcd0b585f5f3fee2ad4fa36ac5d53e9fbf21671ce49f82dab81f755c12bcc823		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5148 bytes

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