Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 102728c425ab59e5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

52.8 KB Created: 2020-08-18 20:48:10 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 91e821aab8a6d2da86e3585363926800 SHA-1: 70315f6fe513174f256cc480ce503941805b8d9b SHA-256: 102728c425ab59e5d71a1010bae54f8f465929d4253dbd38294dbf2d5e8f2040
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to potentially malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains a URL that appears to be part of a link farm designed to drive traffic to malicious sites. The presence of a password-protected archive lure heuristic suggests this PDF is part of a multi-stage attack.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=cavalieri+dello+zodiaco+hades+ita
    • http://naruteped.qacustomvans.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132712326/695875.pdf
    • http://sedivod.tsdickerson.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636725/xikepixijat.pdf
    • http://turusot.aeseric.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437601/zikisalipuwepavele.pdf
    • http://files.westakronfamilydental.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775518/22c5c0a.pdf
    • http://files.athenalenawee.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775304/nivojufo_zekoxobe_vovadukabadofaz.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/3341/9166/files/collateral_management_guide.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0447/7770/1533/files/ac_to_dc_converter_circuit_diagram_without_transformer.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/4161/8082/files/microsoft_access_tutorialspoint.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/6197/8023/files/xaleli.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/5253/0845/files/2316150650.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/2323/5232/files/rakomibav.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/2994/4730/files/character_design_quarterly_6.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/3525/5203/files/20832568422.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6552/3862/files/mifisenok.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/1512/7708/files/o_mio_babbino_caro_imslp.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006fbd.bin
d87377858d8d26d6c49f4f1c1be03bdb4e1a7a7556f08120b1c65cff85392f4c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6FBD 5044 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000080e9.bin
03828ab01287749cbaa5afa5887c0621d640ae74e2024e3aeed85b8e73a360b7		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x80E9 15856 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000b0f9.bin
c988415812f594187b0a0ed75dc52802e798e1695b49bd300f8412a65040a449		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB0F9 16204 bytes

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