RTF malware analysis — malicious · 1020eedb2196bdd8

MALICIOUS

RTF

378.9 KB Created: 2019-01-20 14:19:00 First seen: 2019-08-04

MD5: cce651966d0497b5c419350dd2f7db13 SHA-1: eb0d86145a1b0da8c8502cee82564c8edad40235 SHA-256: 1020eedb2196bdd8313006b8c95c5ef83e463a7e6f5a7f972a635fe03976fc5c

202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects and triggers the ".objupdate" directive, indicating an attempt to activate embedded objects. The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-8759 confirms exploitation of MSXML SAX OLE activation. This suggests the file is designed to exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code, likely as a payload delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 6

Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759

RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0004169f.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x4169F	8592 bytes
SHA-256: `67ff0449c56810ed91342d38f4bcc93b13e25946a55d6fed92fc2708e3e82c64`
`objdata_01_off00045a6f.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x45A6F	18049 bytes
SHA-256: `6c968ac1eb97ead0192cea97f45b634e9a9a6ac10b9fc522e7dc3a01013671cf`
`objdata_02_off00050e9b.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x50E9B	16821 bytes
SHA-256: `a111ccc1f93772e287d5c10b2ec626d2bd40d66899cb63528663bcfb1f9790e0`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY, SC_STR_URLDOWNLOAD, SC_PEB_ACCESS Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: LoadLibraryW, GetProcAddress, URLDownloadToFileW, ExitProcess

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