Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1010f05d27724e0f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

122.2 KB Created: 2021-04-23 18:15:33 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 51df72b288e1a5507afd0b96c8e49fa1 SHA-1: 35a4536cc502816ce1bdfe990924eea907d1c53f SHA-256: 1010f05d27724e0f4f9af0b7951db29d2cb9de9b82ed757482fadd3b5b7cc437
234 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users. The presence of a 'password-protected archive handoff' heuristic indicates a common tactic to bypass security filters. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and link farm behavior are indicative of phishing or malware distribution campaigns.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 8

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://kuzutuzo.ru/strik?utm_term=cinderella+book+summary
    • https://xufiridib.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135346556/darobigejegi.pdf
    • https://rinixupikexem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134096042/0ab44659a.pdf
    • https://sojimivur.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134883767/bopulojola.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4381971/normal_604a4ed0b0f4e.pdf
    • https://lobodilogiji.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131382226/dutejozinekiluk.pdf
    • https://sewimewomem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135323120/kuxekirini.pdf
    • https://zukixuvaxetili.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/9/135988851/texeru-lekames-xivijoputevulin.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4385009/normal_60045b65a6f32.pdf
    • https://zijovegumasapal.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134307166/gakotipomeku-sozejufokokuv-vomezotasop-lisokiwuz.pdf
    • https://vifejekim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135322606/9d8b1a9c7dac2.pdf
    • https://xizidedatisaxos.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132303240/086e6dac4c3.pdf
    • https://xisasuwida.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134472621/9212633.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4411916/normal_6049f4a21de4e.pdf
    • https://xemizumelisiga.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856695/214838.pdf
    • https://pubabugolutaj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132680974/goxututefutigeg-falonib-joxasupu.pdf
    • https://turabevov.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130968962/mosobo-fufujufaxir-zanexix.pdf
    • https://tulopesonu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135318186/b4ec0549901f.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0d5f9680-0361-45a8-9705-659b080b3e1b/where_is_genie_intellicode_learn_button.pdf
    • http://lumadunap.epizy.com/conic_map_projection.pdf
    • http://nosodete.epizy.com/47046183214.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5874cce0-9d27-4a0c-a5e3-88ee938021d2/80905060483.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000190fd.bin
313ab1eb17174a8fe213d429dd0f28208e82d1559e3e3a4ca9f22af6c34c22a0
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x190FD 5100 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001a22e.bin
a0506984d475cb20290fb02639b6e686c2b117a46b024f67c162069f81ae9ee7
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1A22E 14660 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0001cd8e.bin
9f355172d696dda274cac500966718f112ce76951f19577ac4888987ea6471b2
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1CD8E 4324 bytes