IcedID — Office (OOXML) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 100dbae93e04c083…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

153.0 KB Created: 2020-10-27 16:43:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 935543c10ef97eb3bc25a14bb3211e49 SHA-1: 4648beb31098adeb1f483e5960f565b6978ab403 SHA-256: 100dbae93e04c083b140a635e1701c0e4a84e640be2a8512edee213457e9ec26
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

IcedID · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing an obfuscated VBA macro. The macro utilizes `CreateObject` and `Shell.Application` to download and execute a second-stage payload, as indicated by the ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Dropper.IcedID-9799485-1'. The presence of an AutoOpen macro and the use of `CreateObject` strongly suggest the IcedID banking trojan family.

Heuristics 7

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.IcedID-9799485-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.IcedID-9799485-1
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
b325d0cc3c3403900305610b0715d81ff225d3171459c7a33b19e5605f9ebbf6
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 14069 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
9b2ef750c1a557300120b131988e690f02fecb43e7060d6458f130aa74a52ed5
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 49664 bytes